





To the Editor: Fox et al. used
computer-assisted telephone inter-
view (CATI) techniques in an out-
break of cryptosporidiosis (1).
Australian health agencies have used
CATI for several years. A case-control
study during an outbreak of
Salmonella Mbandaka in 1996
employed CATI to interview 15 case-
patients and 45 controls; contaminat-
ed peanut butter was implicated (2).
Foodborne disease outbreaks are
often geographically widespread and
suited to using CATI.
Australian health authorities inves-
tigate ≈100 outbreaks of foodborne
disease each year, with 3–4 using
CATI-based case-control studies.
Some jurisdictions investigate out-
breaks by using CATI interviews of
controls sampled from a bank of
potential study participants (3).
Potential study participants are
recruited at the conclusion of rolling
risk factor survey interviews, similar
to the Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System.
A “control bank” allows investiga-
tors to rapidly obtain contact details
for appropriately matched controls
because age and sex of all household
members are recorded in a database.
Using control banks with CATI allows
completion of studies quicker than
CATI or traditional methods alone (4).
South Australia has used CATI during
11 case-control studies of salmonel-
losis, legionellosis, Q fever, campy-
lobacteriosis, Shiga toxin–producing




During an Australian CATI survey
about gastroenteritis, 5,123 (84%) of
6,087 households agreed to be in a
control bank (5). This bank of 14,024
potential controls was used in 4 case-
control studies of sporadic salmonel-
losis and campylobacteriosis. This
system avoided randomly dialing
thousands of households to enroll
controls in young age groups. The
control bank was used for 3 years
after initial collection, although many
jurisdictions update banks annually.
Investigators may find CATI use-
ful, although it can be costly and intro-
duce biases (4). Programming ques-
tionnaires can delay investigations,
which makes paper-based collection
better in small outbreaks (4). CATI
cannot be used in areas where a small
proportion of the population has tele-
phones. Despite limitations, CATI,
when combined with control banks,
may improve outbreak investigations.
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In Response: We appreciate the
comments of Martyn Kirk and col-
leagues, who describe their experi-
ence using computer-assisted tele-
phone interview (CATI) techniques in
Australia with geographically wide-
spread foodborne outbreaks (1). The
intent of our article was to illustrate 1
example of the use of the CATI infra-
structure in investigating a large com-
munitywide cryptosporidiosis out-
break (2); yet we recognize the appli-
cability of this infrastructure to multi-
ple acute infectious disease outbreak
scenarios.
In our article, we comment that the
use of existing CATI systems, like the
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
System (BRFSS), can provide a prac-
tical means for obtaining controls in
case-control studies, and the letter by
Kirk and colleagues describes their
use of the CATI infrastructure to cre-
ate a “control bank” for acute infec-
tious disease outbreak investigations.
This control bank includes partici-
pants of longitudinal risk factor sur-
veys, like BRFSS, who are subse-
quently recruited as controls for out-
break investigations. We acknowl-
edge that a “bank” of these readily
accessible controls could permit more
rapid recruitment of participants in
numerous age strata and obviate the
need for extensive random digit dial-
ing to recruit an adequate age-
matched control population in many
investigations. Nevertheless, in most
epidemiologic investigations, controls
need to be selected from the same
geographic area as the case-patients,
and even in large telephone surveys,
the number of respondents in any
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given region can be small. This would
make it difficult to recruit enough
controls within the small areas affect-
ed by most outbreaks, particularly
within specific age strata. A control
bank may therefore be more practical
for use in large communitywide out-
breaks, outbreaks that occur over
large regions (i.e., an entire state), or
in densely populated areas.
Additionally, the lengthy start-up time
required for questionnaire program-
ming with a CATI system also sup-
ports the view that the CATI method
may be maximally applicable in large-
scale investigations. 
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To the Editor: Recently, the US
government completed a targeted vac-
cination strategy limited to healthcare
workers, first responders, and the mil-
itary because of concern that variola
virus, the etiologic agent of smallpox,
might be used as a biowarfare agent
(1). A concern in such programs is the
potential for unintended spread of the
vaccine virus (vaccinia) from the pri-
mary vaccinee to contacts who may
be at the greatest risk of having
adverse reactions resulting from sec-
ondary transmission (2,3).
Contact spread of the live attenuat-
ed vaccinia virus is considered the
predominant method of secondary
transmission. The conventional meth-
ods of preventing a secondary trans-
mission event in the household of a
smallpox vaccine recipient include
the use of bandages and long sleeves
to limit direct contact with the lesion
and immediate hand-washing when
contact occurs (4). 
Several recent reports have meas-
ured the presence of vaccinia virus on
the dressings or hands of vaccinated
persons; however, the recovery of
vaccinia virus in the environment has
not been evaluated after vaccination
in a controlled setting (5–7). We pres-
ent the first reported attempt to recov-
er live vaccinia virus from the homes
of recently vaccinated persons. This
study was approved by the St. Louis
University Institutional Review
Board. We hypothesized that live vac-
cinia virus shed from the skin reaction
could not be recovered in the natural
environment, and as a result, consti-
tutes a limited risk for contact trans-
mission.
Three hundred eighty-seven envi-
ronmental swab samples were collect-
ed on 3 different study days from 43
persons (mean age 24 years) with
major cutaneous reactions. Persons
who participated in this study were
selected from a randomized, double-
blind, single-center study that com-
pared the safety, tolerability, and
immunogenicity of 3 smallpox vac-
cines (8,9). Following vaccination
and after each study visit, the vaccina-
tion site was covered with an OpSite
Post-Op dressing (Smith and Nephew,
Massilon, OH, USA). On postvaccina-
tion days 7, 10, and 15, a sterile
Calgiswab type 2 applicator (Harwood
Products Co., Guilford, ME, USA),
moistened in sterile water, was rotated
over the linen from the study partici-
pant’s bed (approximate location of
sleeping area), the middle of his or her
bath towel, and the inside area of a
shirt sleeve adjacent to the vaccina-
tion bandage (before laundering).
These sampling areas were chosen on
the basis of the likelihood of exposure
to the semipermeable bandage and the
potential for another person to come
in contact with the vaccinia virus in
these areas. An additional 129 sam-
ples from the palm of the study partic-
ipant’s hand used to take the environ-
mental samples were taken to serve as
a control mechanism. 
After sampling, the tip of the swab
was stored in a 15-mL conical tube
containing 3 mL multimicrobe trans-
port media (Remel, Lenexa, KS,
USA). The 15-mL conical tubes were
returned to the clinic in a cooler on
cold packs the same day. Recovery of
vaccinia virus was determined by
infectivity assay. Samples were tested
for infectious vaccinia virus by inocu-
lation of fluid cultures of Vero cells
grown in 12-well plates. A sample
was defined as positive if cytopathic
effects were observed (10). 
Concurrent with the environmental
sampling, the lesion and the outside of
the bandage covering the inoculation
site for each study participant were
swabbed with a Calgiswab Type 2
sterile applicator, and the samples
were analyzed by infectivity assay.
These samples served as a positive
control, indicating that the method
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